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NOTABLE TRIALS OF JUDGES
BY EVERETT E. SMITH
Everett E. Smith: admitted to the Minnesota bar in 1933;
practised law in Minneapolis, Washington, D. C., and Kansas
City; former appellate counsel in Denver for the Internal Rev-
enue Service; former Assistant Judge Advocate of the Third
Army in Europe; private practice in Denver since 1954.
It is the business--and happy prerogative-of judges to judge
others. Seldom in Anglo-American legal experience has History
thrust upon a high magistrate the opposite, unenviable role of the
judged. Rare and dramatic occasions of such a reversal of roles and
fortunes, from the time of England's Francis Bacon to that of Amer-
ica's Judge Manton, are the subject of the present review.
Regardless of the resulting verdict, there is a substantial ele-
ment of tragedy in any trial which requires an individual to vindi-
cate himself or suffer the consequences. Ordinarily, the sheer num-
ber of trials occurring daily in the courts prevents any sense of the
personal tragedy from extending beyond those most immediately
concerned to a wider public. In the unusual case of an impeached
or accused judge, it is easier to see the trial for what it is.
BACON
In 1618, Sir Francis Bacon, who already had been Solicitor
General and Attorney General, was raised to peerage and appointed
Lord Chancellor by James I. As Lord Chancellor, Bacon was judge
of the Chancery Court, which exercised sole jurisdiction over suits
in equity. Four years later, in 1622, this brilliant lawyer and judge
-so versatile he took all knowledge for his province and so talented
he is believed by some to have written the works of Shakespeare-
was impeached by the House of Commons. The House of Lords de-
manded an answer to the twenty-eight articles of impeachment
charging bribery. Bacon's answer was "I do plainly and ingenu-
ously confess that I am guilty of corruption and do renounce all
defense**." He was sentenced to pay a fine of £40,000, to be im-
prisoned during the king's pleasure and to be incapable of sitting in
parliament. The king remitted the fine and imprisonment.
Bacon acknowledged the justice of Parliament's action against
him in an oft-quoted remark which seems to condemn that body for
having been remiss in not taking action sooner and against other
judges: "I was the justest judge that was in England these 50
years: But it was the justest censure in Parliament that was these
200 years." The remark also is consistent with Bacon's position that
the moneys received from suitors in Chancery pendente lite were
but gifts which did not affect nor change his judgment. In his en-
forced retirement, Bacon devoted himself to literary and philosophi-
cal work. He died in 1626.1
Bacon's confession of corruption may be accepted as sufficient
See 5 Holdsworth's History of English Law (1924) pp. 240-261; "De Montmorency on Bacon"
in Great Jurists of the World (1914) pp. 144-168; 3 Campbell, Lives of the Lord Chancellors (1880)
pp. 53-127; Rossmon, Coke and Bacon (1952) 38 American Bar Association Journal 42.
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proof that the charges against him were well grounded. This does
not rule out the possibility that they were to some extent politically
motivated. In the struggle of that time between King and Parlia-
ment, Bacon was an adherent of the former. It was the latter body,
with which Bacon's rival, Sir Edward Coke, had aligned himself,
which made and acted upon the charges-a circumstance which
tempts the observation that Parliament "Coked" the King's Bacon.
Whatever the fact in Bacon's case, there seems to be considerable
agreement among the commentators that the next trial to be con-
sidered was brought about for political reasons.
2
PICKERING
John Pickering, a United States district judge who formerly
had been Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire,
was the first federal judge to become enmeshed in the toils of the
law. On February 4, 1803, President Jefferson sent to the House
of Representatives a message referring to Judge Pickering's conduct
in the Eliza case and suggesting an impeachment. The case men-
tioned had been a proceeding to forfeit the ship Eliza for violation
of the customs revenue laws. The judge had refused to hear
witnesses in the case, peremptorily had ordered the ship returned
to its captain, and had refused to permit an appeal.
On March 2, 1804, a House Committee reported a resolution for
Pickering's impeachment for high crimes and misdemeanors. The
resolution was adopted immediately. The judge did not answer or
appear at his trial, but his son presented a petition alleging his
father's madness and praying that the Senate receive evidence to
that effect. The Senate agreed to hear it, but only in mitigation of
the misconduct charged. On March 12, 1804, the sixty-seven year
old judge was convicted by a vote of 19 to 7, and sentenced to re-
moval from office. He died in April of the next year.
The Pickering case has generated considerable comment. Sen-
ator Beveridge, the biographer of John Marshall, accepts the view
that the judge was "hopelessly insane" and as a result had become
"an incurable drunkard." He refers to Henry Adams' characteriz-
ation of the conviction as infamous and illegal.3 In his article on
the impeachment of the federal judiciary, Brown expresses doubt
of Pickering's insanity and adds, with seeming irrelevance, that if
insanity did exist it "was attributable to habitual intemperance". 4
A federal court has mentioned the historian McMaster's concur-
rence in the verdict of Henry Adams. The court also stated that
after his conviction "Pickering was adjudged insane by proper
authority." 5
According to the Constitution, federal judges hold their offices
during good behavior but are impeachable only for treason, bribery
or other high crimes or misdemeanors.6 It seems fairly clear that
2 See Cummings and McFarland, Federal Justice (1937) pp. 54-55; 3 Beveridge, Life of John
Marshall (1919) pp. 143, 164 and 167.
See 3 Beveridge, Life of John Marshall (1919) 143 and 164 et. seq.
4 Brown, The Impeachment of the Federal Judiciary (1913) 26 Harv. L. Rev. 684, 700.
. Ritter v. United States (Ct. CIs., 1936) 84 Ct. CIs. 293, 299 cert .den. 300 U. S. 668.
6 Article Ill and section 4 of Article II. See also Article 1, section 3, cl. 6; Article 1, section 3,
cl. 7; Article 1, section 2, cl. 5; Article II, section 2, cl. 1; Article III, section 2, cl. 2.
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performing judicial duties while drunk is a lapse from good be-
havior. That such conduct constitutes a high crime or misdemeanor
is less clear but not a wholly unwarranted conclusion if the consti-
tutional category of crimes and misdemeanors is construed as quali-
fied by the concept of good behavior. Moreover, it is far more
serious for a judicial officer (as for a military officer) to be drunk
on duty than it ordinarily is for a private individual to be drunk
off-duty.
By the common law, an accused generally has a defense to a
criminal charge if at the time of the act or conduct in question his
state of mind was that characterized by the criminal law as insane.
According to one view of the situation in the Pickering case, the
*automatic message
and answerinq
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your voice to answer incoming calls while
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respondent's insanity, far from being recognized as a defense, was
even begrudged any consideration in mitigation or extenuation.
It seems sufficiently clear that insanity or mental incompetence
on the part of a judge is, per se, neither misbehavior nor a high
crime or misdemeanor. Perhaps the conduct flowing from such
mental impairment stands on a different footing.
7
The truth seems to be, however, that there is no wholly satis-
factory solution to a substantive legal problem such as that pre-
sented by the Pickering case (assuming the judge was in an irrat-
ional and not merely a drunken state at the time of the proceed-
ings in the Eliza case). The Constitution contains no provision
for the removal of a federal judge who is mentally incompetent or
suffering from a disabling physical ailment.8 Nevertheless, a sep-
aration of the unfortunate officer from judicial functions seems
warranted in the public interest. To effect the removal by im-
peachment seems comparable to clipping fingernails with a guil-
lotine, but it is doubtful that any other method is permissable
under the Constitution. 9
The procedure followed by the Senate sitting as a Court of
Impeachment in Judge Pickering's case reveals several contrasts
with the presently approved procedure in the regular, federal
courts. The Court proceeded to hear the charges without regard,
apparently, to the judge's capacity at that time to understand
the charges and to cooperate with counsel in his defense.' 0 Again,
the Court of Impeachment did not consider the presence of the
judge or his representation by counsel as indispensable under
the circumstances." The trial proceeded in his absence and in the
absence of counsel.
In noting the foregoing it is not intended to suggest that the
rules developed by the regular federal judiciary for the cases
within its cognizance are ipso facto standards of perfection to
which Courts of Impeachment should conform in the exercise
7 This paragraph is not intended to suggest that impeachable offenses are to be equated with
:riminal offenses.
Cf. 3 Beveridge, Life of John Marshall (1919) p. 165.
il Cf. Ritter v. United States, cited in footnote 5; Note, The Exclusiveness of the Impeachment
Power under the Constitution (1937) 51 Harv. L. Rev. 330; Note, Removal of Federal Judges; A
Proposed Plan (1937) 31 III. 1. R. 631.
1 0See Massey v. Moore (1954) 75 Sup. Ct. 145.
ii Cf. Hopt v. Utah (1884) 110 U. S. 262. But cf. Blackmer v. United States (1932) 284 U. S. 421.
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of their jurisdiction. To the extent such rules of procedure are
founded upon reasons of justice, however, departures should be
warranted by the difference in the nature of the cases which
come before the Courts of Impeachment or not be made.
CHASE
Within an hour after John Pickering was convicted, the
House voted to impeach Samuel Chase, an Associate Justice of the
United States Supreme Court, for high crimes and misdemeanors.'
The justice, who was about sixty-four years of age at the time,
had been a signer of the Declaration of Independence, a leader
of the Maryland bar, and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of Maryland. President Washington had appointed Chase to the
Supreme Court of the United States in 1796, about eight years
prior to the initiation of the proceedings against the justice.
The eight articles of impeachment presented to the Senate
almost a year after the aforesaid vote to impeach called in ques-
tion the justice's charge to a grand jury at Baltimore in 1803;
his attempt in Delaware to secure an indictment under the se-
dition law by inquisitorial methods; his legal rulings and con-
duct in 1800 in the trials of John Fries for treasonous resist-
ance to federal taxation and of James Callender for violation
of the federal sedition law. In the charge to the grand jury,
Justice Chase had attacked universal suffrage, criticized Pres-
ident Jefferson's administration as weak, and disapproved the
repeal of the Circuit Court Act by the Jefferson administration.
In the second trial of Fries in Philadelphia, Chase had made up
his mind on the law of treason before the jury was sworn. In
Virginia, he had treated counsel for Callender with sarcastic
contempt. This, in brief, was the tenor of the charges.
On February 4, 1805, the Senate convened as a Court of
Impeachment to hear the charges. Vice President Aaron Burr
with but a month of office remaining, presided. Chief Justice
Marshall, later to be a witness in the case, was a worried spec-
tator. The other justices of the Supreme Court likewise were
present. Among the managers for the House was John Randolph
of Roanoke, Virginia. Chief among the brilliant array of coun-
sel for the respondent was Luther Martin, the bibulous leader
of the Maryland bar.
The details of the evidence and argument in this celebrated
American counterpart of the trial of Warren Hastings need not
detain us here. Beveridge's Life of Marshall and Warren's Supreme
Court in United States History evoke the color, pageantry and
significance of this occasion as Macaulay did for the British pro-
totype. It is enough to point out that when the arguments were
over and the Senate had voted, there was not a two-thirds ma-
jority for conviction on any of the articles. On March 1, 1805,
Burr announced that Chase was acquitted of all the articles ex-
hibited against him.
12 3 Beveridge, Life of John Marshall (1919) p. 169.
SACHS-LAWLOR- CORPORATIOn SEALS- ALPINE 5-3422
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During the trial, the Senate held its legislative sessions in
a Committee room before noon. The court sessions were held
in the Senate Chamber in the afternoon. As for Justice Chase,
neither the trial nor the physical pain which he suffered from
the gout prevented him from taking his seat upon the Bench at
the 1805 Term. Though continuing to suffer from the gout, Chase
lived until 1811.13
The decisions in the Eliza, Fries and Callender cases invite
several incidental, slightly satirical, reflections. Is the "gastro-
nomic school of jurisprudence" comforted or confounded by the
possibility that Judge Pickering's impaired reason and Justice
Chase's afflicted feet may have affected their judgment in the
mischievous cases mentioned? May one infer from the fact that
the respective counsel in the Fries and Callender cases threw up
their briefs that contented feet are even more important to good
judgment than sound reason, sobriety, or a well-regulated diges-
tion?
HALSTED L. RITTER
Of the two federal judges impeached during the remainder
of the nineteenth century, one, James H. Peck, Judge of the
133 Beveridge, Life of John Marshall (1919) pp. 169-222; 1 Warren, Supreme Court in United
3tates History (New, rev. ed., 1928) pp. 276 et seq.; 4 Dictionary of American Biography pp.
35-37. For the Fries case, see 11 Lawson's American State Trials pp. 146-174. See also the report
of the Callender case in 10 Lawson's American State Trials 813 et seq.
DONALD B. GRAHAM, Pres. CLAUDE L. GOFF, Vice Pres.
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United States District Court for the District of Missouri, was
acquitted; the other, West H. Humphries, Judge of the United
States District Court for the District of Tennessee, was con-
victed on charges relating to activities in aid of the Southern
Confederacy. In this century, there has been one conviction, one
resignation to forestall trial, and two acquittals prior to the trial
of Judge Halsted L. Ritter in 1936.14
Judge Ritter, who had lived and practiced law with distinc-
tion for thirty years in Denver, Colorado, went to Florida in
1925 because of his wife's health. 15 He took office as a United
States District Judge for the Southern District of Florida in Feb-
ruary, 1929. The original impeachment resolution was introduced
in the House of Representatives in May, 1933. An investigation
and report were made. There the matter rested until 1936, when,
a week after the Supreme Court invalidated the Agricultural
Adjustment Act, the question was raised again. On January 14,
1936, Representative Green of Florida on his own responsibility
as a member of the House revived the charges.
16
The House agreed upon a resolution to impeach Judge Ritter
of misbehavior and high crimes and misdemeanors on March 2,
1936.17 Amendments were made on March 31, 1936.18 In brief,
the respondent was charged with practising law in violation of
statute; receiving fees and gratuities; income tax violations; and
the final article, 7, combined various charges, most of which, if
not all, were pleaded in the preceding six articles. The respond-
ent filed an answer on April 3, 1936 which pleaded that the al-
leged offenses were not impeachable and also contained a denial
of the articles of impeachment. 19 A formal replication was made
on behalf of the House.
On April 6, 1936, the trial began with the opening statements
made on behalf of the House and the respondent. 20 Thereafter,
the Senate sitting (and sworn) as a Court of Impeachment
held daily sessions from noon to 1:30 P. M. and from 2:00 o'clock
to 5:30 P. M. Between 25 and 30 witnesses were heard. Questions
by members of the Court were reduced to writing and put by the
Presiding Officer. Closing arguments were made on April 13 and
14.21 On April 17, 1936, the roll call of Senators revealed less
than the two-thirds majority constitutionally required for con-
viction on the first six articles. The respondent was convicted
of the charges in the seventh article, and adjudged removed from
office.
22
Thereafter, Judge Ritter filed a petition in the United States
Court of. Claims seeking to recover his judge's salary for the
month of April, 1936. In this suit, the petitioner raised anew
the claim that the charges made in the articles of impeachment
14 For details, see Brown's article, cited in footnote 4 and Ten Broek, Partisan Politics and
Federal Judgeship Impeachment Since 1903 (1939) 23 Minn. L. Rev. 185.
1 5 74th Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. 80, pt. 3, p. 3088; pt. 4, p. 3646.
16 74th Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. 80, pt. 1, p. 404.
17 74th Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. 80, pt. 3, p. 3066, 3092.
IR 74th Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. 80, pt. 4, pp. 4654-55.
I 974th Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. 80, pt. 5, pp. 4899 et seq.
20 74th Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. 80, pt. 5, pp. 4972 et seq.
"2 74th Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. 80, pt. 5, pp. 5401 et seq.
22 74th Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. 80, pt. 5, pp. 5602, 5606-5607.
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were not impeachable offenses. The conviction on the seventh
article was attacked on the ground that the matters alleged in
that article were merely restatements of the charges in the prior
articles.
23
The Court of Claims dismissed the petition, stating (at page
300):
"Our conclusion is that we have no authority to re-
view the impeachment proceedings held in the Senate and
decide whether the accusations made against the plaintiff
were such that he could properly be impeached thereon,
nor can we pass upon the question of whether his acquit-
tal on the first six articles was a bar to prosecution under
the seventh. In our opinion, the Senate was the sole tri-
bunal that could take jurisdiction of the articles of im-
peachment presented to that body against the plaintiff
and its decision is final."
BEN B. LINDSEY
There is some disagreement among the commentators about
the merits of the impeachment procedure. It is not the only
means, however, which has been used for bringing a judge to
trial with respect to his judicial conduct. In one very difficult
but interesting case involving a former state judge, the judge
was called upon to vindicate himself in a disbarment proceeding.
In another instance, a judge of a United States Circuit Court of
Appeals was tried in the regular federal courts on criminal
charges.
Prior to the expiration of his term of office in July, 1927,
the well-known Judge Ben B. Lindsey of the Juvenile Court of
Denver, Colorado had received sums totalling $47,500 which gave
rise to an original proceeding in disbarment in the Supreme Court
of Colorado. The information filed on behalf of the State charged
that the receipt of the two sums comprising the total was illegal
and gravely unethical in that they represented unlawful extra
compensation to the respondent as judge or fees for the wrongful
practice of law by a judge, or both.
The judge's answer admitted the receipt in 1926 of $37,500
from the mother, and guardian of the estate, of two minor chil-
dren as well as the receipt in the same year of $10,000 from Sam-
uel Untermyer, the New York lawyer who had asserted for the
guardian the right of the children to share in the estate of their
deceased father, the guardian's divorced husband. The judge's
answer asserted, however, that said sums were not legal fees
nor extra compensation to him as judge but gifts made in recog-
nition of his friendly mediation in the dispute between the
mother and her children on the one side and the claimant under
the decedent's will on the other. The will proceedings were pend-
ing in a surrogate court of New York.
The State moved for judgment and the case was decided on
23 Ritter v. United States, cited in footnote 5.
SACHS- LE LOR- CORPOR ATIOR SEIS- ALPInE 5-3422
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the pleadings. The Supreme Court of Colorado held that Judge
Lindsey should be disbarred. The decision was based, primarily
at least, on the view that the moneys received by Judge Lindsey
were legal fees. On the Supreme Court's denial of an application
which the judge made for reinstatement several years later, two
justices dissented. One of the dissenting justices made the fol-
lowing observations which illuminate the above-mentioned dif-
ficulties of the case:
"The respondent has made it difficult for a member
of the court to vote for his reinstatement. After his
disbarment, he published attacks upon the members of the
court, assailing them in language that I do not approve.**
"In the typical disbarment case the misconduct of the
respondent generally results in injury to some person. In
the present case no person suffered injury by reason of the
respondent's conduct. On the contrary, every person con-
nected with the transaction received a substantial benefit
by reason of the respondent's activities, was highly pleased,
and expressed gratitude to the respondent for his efforts."




Judge Martin T. Manton, the senior judge of the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, having
been convicted by a jury of conspiracy to obstruct the adminis-
tration of justice and to defraud the United States, appealed.
The judge raised a number of points, the most noteworthy of which
for present purposes was to the effect that he had not obstructed
justice by receiving money from suitors in various specified
civil cases pending before him because in the favorable decisions
for such suitors he had voted to decide the cases according to
law. The appellate court overruled that contention summarily,
saying (at page 845) "Judicial action, whether just or unjust,
right or wrong, is not for sale."
The Circuit Court's decision affirming Judge Manton's con-
viction was rendered on December 4, 1938. Not until February,
1939, did the judge resign from the bench. Thereafter, the United
States Supreme Court denied certiorari.
25
There is an element of grim, ironic humor in a comparison
of the first and last of these tragedies chosen from the assort-
ment of legal history. In the last case, the law appears to have
been sufficiently elastic to permit the court on which Judge
Manton sat to enter correct decisions in favor of the bribing
litigants. In the time of Bacon, it was not so, and some of the
gift-giving suitors had to be disappointed in the Lord Chancellor's
just judgments.
24 People v. Lindsey (Colo., 1929) 283 Pac. 539; (1933) 23 P. 2d 118; (1935) 52 P. 2d 663. See
Lindsey and Borough, The Dangerous Life (1931) for the judge's reaction to his disbarment and
Sears and Goldman, Disbarment of Judge Lindsey (1931) 25 I1. L. R. 569, for a disinterested
comment.
25 United States v. Manton (2nd Cir., 1938) 107 F. 2d 834, cert. den. (1940) 309 U. S. 664.
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